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L Facts
On the evening of November 22, 1996, Catherine Taylor ("Taylor")
and Stanley Roger Beale ("Beale") were at home at the University Terrace
Apartments with their children, Bianca, Monique, and Sidney. Taylor was
in the bedroom with Sidney when she heard "a boom-like noise." As
Taylor entered the living room, she saw a man kick in the front door. The
man, whom she later identified as Darick Demorris Walker ("Walker"), was
holding a gun yelling "Where is he?" Still shouting, Walker asked Beale,
"what you keep coming up to my door, what you looking for me for?"
Beale denied knowing who Walker was or where he lived. Taylor's thirteen
year old daughter, Bianca, also shouted at Walker that Beale did not know
him. Walker began shooting at Beale. Taylor took Bianca and Monique
into the bathroom to hide in the bathtub. Walker shot Beale three times,
killing him.'
Both Bianca and fourteen-year-old Tameira Patterson ("Patterson")
testified that they knew Walker as "Todd" and positively identified him in
a photo lineup. Patterson, who was visiting a friend at the University
Terrace Apartments on the day of the murder, testified that "Todd" entered
her friend's apartment and later told her "I shot him."2
On June 18, 1997, Andrea Noble ("Noble") and Clarence Threat
("Threat"), asleep in their bedroom, were awakened when they heard a
"pop," followed by a knock, coming from the screen door.3 Noble went to
the door and peered through a small window, but did not see anyone.
Noble twice returned to the door after hearing knocking, but still did not
see anyone. Sometime thereafter, the door was "kicked open" and upon
entering the living room, Noble saw a man she knew as "Paul" holding a
gun. At trial, she identified "Paul" as Walker. "Paul" pointed the gun at
Noble. She began backing up and, when they reached the bedroom, "Paul"
hit Noble with the back of the gun and shot Threat in the leg. After a
verbal exchange with Threat, "Paul" shot him seven times, once fatally to
1. Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Va. 1999).
2. Id. at 569.
3. Id.
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the chest. "Paul" threatened to come back and kill Noble and her children
if she told anyone about the incident.'
Walker was tried and convicted of the capital murder of Stanley Roger
Beale and Clarence Threat within a three year period, in violation of section
18.2-31(8) of the Virginia Code.' The jury found the existence of both
aggravating factors, vileness and future dangerousness, and recommended
the death sentence. The judge imposed the sentence accordingly.6
On appeal, Walker alleged the following trial errors: (1) Virginia's death
penalty statutes are unconstitutional;7 (2) the trial court's failure to order the
Commonwealth to provide him with a bill of particulars violated his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel;' (3) Brady v. Maryland
entitled him to discovery of all evidence and materials which the Common-
wealth intended to rely upon to establish his guilt; 0 (4) he was denied
additional peremptory challenges necessary to ensure his Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights;" (5) the admission of evidence of
unadjudicated acts violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel;" (6) the trial court improperly admitted certain evidence and
improperly excluded other evidence;1 (7) the Commonwealth's evidence
was insufficient to convict him of capital murder as a matter of law;14 and
(8) the death sentence was imposed arbitrarily, and was excessive and dispro-
portionate to penalties imposed in similar cases."
II. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia, rejecting all of Walker's claims, con-
cluded that the trial court committed no reversible error and that the death
sentence was properly imposed. 16
4. Id.
5. Id. at 568. See VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(8) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999). Walker
was also convicted of four counts of the use of a firearm and two counts of burglary.
6. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 568.
7. Id. at 569. See VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-264.2-19.2-264.5, 17.1-313 (Michie 1999).
8. Walker, 515 S.E. 2d. at 570.
9. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 570. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1993) (holding
that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process
if the evidence is material to punishment or guilt).
11. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 571.
12. Id. at 571.
13. Id. at 573-74.
14. Id. at 575.
15. Id. at 576-77.




A. Bill of Particulars
Walker requested a bill of particulars outlining the grounds for the
capital murder charge and the evidence on which the Commonwealth
intended to rely, including a request for a "narrowing construction" of the
aggravating factors. 8 The Commonwealth informed Walker that it planned
17. The court addressed but routinely dismissed several of Walker's claims and
therefore they will not be discussed in detail in this note. The claims are as follows:
(1) Constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty. Walker argued that the aggravating
factors used in sentencing are unconstitutionally vague. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 569. He further
alleged that the failure to dearly define the aggravating factors for the jury and properly
inform the jury regarding mitigation evidence resulted in a violation of his rights under both
the Virginia Constitution as well as the Eighth and Fourth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. Id. The court summarily dismissed Walker's contentions as being long-settled
by previous decisions upholding the constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty statutes.
Id.
(2) Discovery. Walker maintained that under Brady he was entitled to all of the
evidence, information, and materials which the Commonwealth intended to use in establish-
ing his guilt. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 570. Affirming that both the Due Process Clause and
Brady require only the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the court saw absolutely no merit
in Walker's claim and concluded that Walker received all the discovery to which he was
entitled. Id.
(3) Admissibility of photographs into evidence. Walker contested the admission of
crime scene and autopsy photographs into evidence during the guilt and sentencing phases.
He claimed that the photographs were presented to induce jury sympathy and were not
substantially necessary to the Commonwealth's case. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 574. The Fourth
Circuit averred that photographs may be used to show method, atrociousness, motive,
malice, and premeditation, and that the decision whether to admit them is within the trial
court's discretion which will not be upset save a clear abuse of discretion. Id. The court
found that the crime scene photos were accurate representations of the scene and depicted
incidents of the murder which were relevant and probative. Id. Likewise, the court adjudged
that the autopsy photos depicting the victim's wounds were relevant to the issue of vileness.
Id. Hence, the court determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion by admit-
ting the photographs into evidence. Id.
(4) Admissibility of toxicologist report. Walker argued that the toxicologist report
detailing the presence of drugs in each victim's body should have been admitted as circum-
stantial evidence of a possible alternative motive for someone else who may have committed
the murders. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 574. The court rebuffed Walker's claimand held that the
presence of drugs in a victim's body alone does not support the inference that someone else
committed the murder and thus the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. Id.
(5) Additional peremptory challenges. The court found that Walker failed with his
claim that he was entitled to additional peremptory challenges in order to insure his rights
under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 571. Neither the United States Constitution nor Virginia law affords
criminal defendants the right to additional peremptory challenges. Id. (citing Mu'Min v.
Commonwealth, 500 U.S. 415, 424425 (1991); Strickler v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 227,
232 (Va. 1991); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 613 (Va. 1990)); see VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-262 (Michie 1999). The court held that Walker did not advance an argument
necessitating a departure from the court's previous decisions. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 571.
18. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 570.
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to establish both future dangerousness and vileness as a basis for the death
sentence.19 The prosecution also generally explained the evidence on which
it intended to rely to prove the aggravating factors.2" On appeal, Walker
argued that the trial court's failure to order a bill of particulars denied him
of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and his
underlying due process right.21
The court rejected Walker's claim, asserting that there is no general
constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases, including those involving
capital murder.2 The court asserted that a defendant may be entitled to a
bill of particulars if the indictment is found to be insufficient.23 Otherwise,
the trial court may require a bill of particulars at its discretion.24 Because
Walker did not allege that the indictment was insufficient and there was no
evidence that the trial court abused its discretion, the court found Walker's
argument baseless.2" However, the court's finding that a bill of particulars
is not required unless an indictment is insufficient ignores its own longstand-
ing precedent which categorically states that a bill of particulars cannot cure
a defective indictment. In Hagood v. Commonwealth6 and Pine v. Common-
wealth, the court pointed out that a bill of particulars may supplement a
generalized indictment, but can never remedy a bad indictment. This new
rule, that a defendant must challenge the sufficiency of the indictment
before moving for a bill of particulars, first appeared in Swisher v. Common-
wealth.29 This rule directly contradicts prior Virginia law as well as the law
as generally understood in the United States.3" This new rule also confuses
the role of a motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to charge an
offense 1 with the motion for bill of particulars.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 569.
22. Id. at 570 (citing Strickler, 404 S.E.2d at 233).
23. Id. See Strickler, 404 S.E. 2d at 233 (holding that an indictment is sufficient if it gives
the accused "notice of the nature and character of the offense charged so he can make his
defense") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 570.
25. Id.
26. 162 S.E. 10 (Va. 1932).
27. 93 S.E. 652 (Va. 1917).
28. See Hagood v. Commonwealth, 162 S.E. 10,12 (Va. 1932); Pine v. Commonwealth,
93 S.E. 652, 659 (Va. 1917).
29. 506 S.E.2d 763, 768 (Va. 1998).
30. See L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Right ofAccused to Bill of Particulars, 5 A.L.R.2d 444
(1949).
31. See VA. SUP. CT. R 3A:9(b)(1).
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C. Unadjudicated Criminal Acts
Walker contested the use of unadjudicated criminal acts in the sentenc-
ing phase. 2 Walker challenged the admission of the unadjudicated criminal
conduct on the following grounds: (1) absent a direct connection of the
evidence to Walker by some standard of proof, the evidence failed to meet
the test of relevancy; 3 (2) due process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of conduct used to expose a defendant to additional punishment;34 and
(3) the use of unadjudicated criminal acts effectively denied his due process
rights to notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard and thus denied
him the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.3
Evidence of any prior violent criminal conduct is relevant to the future
dangerousness determination since it tends to show a defendant's propensity
to commit future violent acts.' Nevertheless, evidence used to establish an
ultimate fact must be measured by some standard of proof. 7 The ultimate
fact-in this case, future dangerousness-must be established beyond a reason-
able doubt.3" The court concluded that each piece of evidence offered to
prove the ultimate fact is not subject to the reasonable doubt standard of
proof." In other words, the prosecutor need not establish beyond a reason-
able doubt the evidence used as a predicate to a finding of future dangerous-
ness.
40
Walker further contended that unadjudicated criminal acts must be
tested by the reasonable doubt standard at sentencing in a capital murder
case "because it exposes a defendant to a greater punishment and presents a
radical departure from customary sentencing procedures.""' The court
rejected this claim on the ground that a defendant is subject to the death
penalty upon a statutory finding of future dangerousness or vileness, which




36. Id. at 571 (citing Pruett v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (Va. 1986) (noting




40. The use of unadjudicated criminal acts to determine future dangerousness absent
a finding that the defendant committed an act beyond a reasonable doubt diminishes the great
amount of reliability which a death sentence requires. For a more thorough discussion on
the constitutionality of Virginia's use of unadjudicated criminal acts in the sentencing
determination, see Tommy Barrett, A Modest Proposal: Requiring Proof Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt For Unadjudicated Acts Offered To Prove Future Dangerousness, CAP. DEF. J., Spring
1998, at 58.
41. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 571.
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must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.42 The court
referred to the United States Supreme Court's holding in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania43 to affirm that the prosecution need not "prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact it recognizes as a circumstance affecting the
severity of punishment.""
The court admitted that Walker's attempt to raise a Sixth Amendment
claim45 without raising the issue of counsel's performance at trial may be
sufficient in some situations.' However, such a finding requires circum-
stances which warrant a presumption of ineffectiveness.4" The admission of
unadjudicated criminal conduct fails to raise an presumption of ineffective
assistance of counsel.48
D. Prison Life as Mitigating Evidence
Walker sought to use testimony regarding the conditions of prison life
as a mitigating factor during the sentencing phase.' The court, reaffirming
its decision in Cherrix v. Commonwealth, ° held that testimony regarding
prison conditions is not proper mitigating evidence."1 The court in both
Walker and Cherrix asserted that evidence of the conditions of life imprison-
ment without parole cannot be introduced to mitigate future dangerousness.
The Commonwealth's burden of proving future dangerousness beyond a
reasonable doubt necessitates a showing that the defendant is a continuing
42. Id. at 572. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Nfichie 1999).
43. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
44. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 572 (quotingMcMillan v. Pennsylvania 477 U.S. 79,85 (1986))
(citations omitted). Note that the United States Supreme Court's decision injones v. United
States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) casts doubt upon the principle stated inMcMilan. See Jones, 119
S. Ct. at 1216 (holding that statutory provisions establishing higher penalties when the
offense resulted in serious bodily injury or death were additional elements of the offense to
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt rather than mere sentencing enhancements to be
proven by a preponderance of evidence).
45. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 572. Walker claimed that forcing an attorney to defend
against past unadjudicated criminal conduct is "beyond the resources and realm of effective
representation." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 572-73 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984)). The court
gives the following examples of circumstances which may justify a presumption of ineffec-
tiveness: (1) where counsel was totally absent; (2) where counsel was prevented from assisting
during a critical phase; and (3) when counsel was prevented from exercising independent
judgment in conducting the defense. Id.
48. Id. at 573.
49. Id. at 574. Walker wished to introduce the testimony of the Chief of Operations
for the Virginia Department Corrections to attest to the conditions of life imprisonment in
a maximum security facility without parole. Id.
50. 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999).




threat to society. 2 However, death and life without parole are the only
sentencing options for defendants convicted of capital murder in Virginia.
3
Thus, a defendant convicted of capital murder poses a threat solely to
"prison society." Accordingly, defense attorneys should offer testimony of
prison life and the unavailability of parole to directly rebut the prosecution's
assertion that a defendant is a continuing threat to prison society, rather
than offering it as mitigating evidence.' Pursuing this course of action
should guarantee admission of evidence of prison life and avoid the holding
in Cherrix. The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse is developing this
argument and defense attorneys are encouraged to contact the Clearing-
house for more information.
E. Admissibility and Sufficiency of Evidence
1. Cartridge
Steve Martin ("Martin"), property manager for the University Terrace
Apartments, found a cartridge case in Walker's previous apartment." A
certificate of analysis matched this cartridge case to cartridge cases discov-
ered at the scene of the Beale murder.s6 Walker objected to admission of
Martin's testimony and the certificate of analysis on the grounds that they
were irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial in excess of their probative
value. 7 The court asserted that every fact, regardless of how minute, which
"establishes the probability or improbability of a fact in issue, is factually
relevant and admissible." 8 Because Martin's testimony and the certificate
of analysis implicated Walker in the Beale murder, the court found that the
evidence was indeed relevant.5 9 The court also explained that the four
months that had elapsed between Martin's discovery of the cartridge and the
murder went only to the weight of the evidence and not its relevancy or
admissibility.' Furthermore, the court acknowledged that exclusion or
admission of factually relevant evidence by weighing its probative value
against the risk of unfair prejudice is a determination within the trial court's
52. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1999).
53. See VA. CODE ANN. SS 53.1-151(B1), 53.1-165.1. (Michie 1999).
54. See David D. Leshner, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 419 (1999) (analyzing Cherrix,
513 S.E.2d 642).
55. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 573.
56. Id.
57. Id.





discretion.61 The court held that Walker failed to establish prejudice from
the admission of evidence regarding the cartridge; thus, there was no error.'
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Walker further argued that the Commonwealth's guilt evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law in that the sole evidence, eyewitness testi-
mony, was inherently incredible. 3 Specifically, Walker asserted that the
ages of two of the witness (thirteen and fourteen), contradictory statements
by one witness, and inconsistent statements by another, rendered the
evidence inherently incredible.' Without much discussion, the court
pronounced that the trier of fact is the sole judge of witnesses' credibility
and that while those issues are to be weighed, they do not support a finding
that the testimony was inherently incredible.'
F. Arbitrary Factor and Excessive/Disproportionate Death Sentence Review
Walker invoked section 17.1-313(C) of the Virginia Code,66 which
mandates the Supreme Court of Virginia to review whether a death sentence
was imposed arbitrarily and whether the sentence was excessive or dispro-
portionate to penalties imposed in similar cases.67 The court found nothing
in the record to suggest that the sentence had been imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor."
Walker's case is the court's first proportionality review of a death
sentence imposed for the killing of more than one person within a three
year period in violation of section 18.2-31(8) of the Code of Virginia.69
Absent existing cases prosecuted under that statutory provision, the court
examined Walker against factually similar cases in which the jury recom-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 573-574.
63. Id. at 575.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Section 17.1-313(C) of the Virginia Code reads:
In addition to consideration of any errors in the trial enumerated by appeal, the
court shall consider and determine:
1. Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; and
2. Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crine and the defendant.
VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C) (Michie 1999).
67. WaLker, 515 S.E.2d at 576.
68. Id.
69. Id. See VA. CODE ANN. S18.2-31(8) (Michie 1999).
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mended a death sentence. 0 Past juries have recommendeddeath sentences.
where victims were killed at home in front of family members and in cases
of multiple homicides." The court found these situations analogous to
Walker and concluded that the death sentence was proper.72
It should also be noted that the court considered the gap in time be-
tween Beale's and Threat's murders as demonstrative of a heightened disre-
gard for human life beyond that found where multiple victims are killed in
the same incident.73
Latanya R. White
70. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 576-77.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 577.
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